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5419ea4)
Note: This allows a replay attack where a malicious user can cause a
message to appear to be sent later than it was by re-sending it.
I'm not going to worry about any of these types of issues until the
crypto is in place, which will guard against most of them.
// Time: The server timestamp of the first copy to arrive
// ID: Some unique string for deduping
// Text: The text of the message
// Time: The server timestamp of the first copy to arrive
// ID: Some unique string for deduping
// Text: The text of the message
+ // ServerTimes: server -> timestamp
// UI: The DOM node for this message in the UI
function rcnick() {
// UI: The DOM node for this message in the UI
function rcnick() {
var m = messages[i];
m.Time = new Date(m.Time);
var seen_key = make_seen_key(m.ID, m.Text);
var m = messages[i];
m.Time = new Date(m.Time);
var seen_key = make_seen_key(m.ID, m.Text);
- if (!(seen_key in seen)) {
+ if (seen_key in seen) {
+ seen[seen_key].ServerTimes[server] = m.Time;
+ } else {
+ m.ServerTimes = {server: m.Time};
seen[seen_key] = m;
rcaddmessagetohistory(m);
for (var i in servers) {
seen[seen_key] = m;
rcaddmessagetohistory(m);
for (var i in servers) {